A Comparison Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

A Comparison Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms

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Part of #A Comparison Study of Multi-Attribute Continuous Double Auction Mechanisms# :

Publishing year : 2013

Conference : 7th International Conference on Electronic Commerce in Developing Countries with an Approach to Security

Number of pages : 15

Abstract: Auctions have been as a competitive method for buying and selling valuable or rare items for a long time. Single-sided auctions in which participants negotiate on a single attribute (e.g. price) are very popular. Double auctions and negotiation for multiple attributes create more advantages than single-sided and single-attribute auctions. Nonetheless, thisadds the complexity of the auction. Any auction mechanism needs to be budget balanced, Pareto optimal, individually rational, and coalition proof. Satisfying all these properties is not so trivial so that no multi-attribute double auction mechanism could address all these restrictions. This research analyzes and compares GM, timestamp-based and social-welfaremaximization mechanisms for multi-attribute double auctions. The analysis of the simulation results shows that Gimple and Makio's proposed algorithm satisfies moreproperties compared with other methods for such auction mechanism. This multi-attribute double auction mechanism is based on game theory and behaves fairer in matching and arbitration